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it revealed wide community support for the legality of the measures em-
ployed by the United States.
Critics of the self-defense argument contend that self-defense is too
dangerous an instrument, and therefore the United Nations Charter must
be so construed as to forbid its invocation. But the alternatives seem
even more dangerous. Conceding, as these critics do, that states whose
survival is threatened will nonetheless react to such threats, such responses
will then be either outside or above the law. Surely, this cannot be more
desirable. The measures employed by the United States were not "pre-
ventive war." They were moderate measures, skillfully executed, whose
purpose was to prevent war. Under all the circumstances, factual and
legal, the quarantine of Cuba constituted substantial compliance with
both the spirit and the content of the principles and procedures of the
world community.
BRUNSoN MACCHESNEY
THE SOVIET-CUBAN QUARANTINE AND SELF-DEFENSE
In an article appearing elsewhere in this issue Professor Quincy Wright
concludes-among many other things, most of which are largely dependent
upon this particular conclusion-that the quarantine imposed by the
United States in October, 1962, upon the importation of offensive weapons
into Cuba cannot be regarded as a lawful exercise by the United States
of the right of self-defense. This conclusion Professor Wright seeks to
establish by interpreting Article 51 of the United Nations Charter as
limiting the traditional right of self-defense by states to reactions against
"actual armed attack." Such an interpretation enables him, since the
United States acted before any actual firing of the weapons, to avoid the
difficult task of a careful appraisal of the United States' measure for its
necessity and proportionality in total context. With greatest deference
to Professor Wright, it may be suggested both that his conclusion is not
a necessary one and that his reasoning is inimical to appropriate clarifica-
tion under contemporary conditions of the common interest in a viable
minimum world public order.
The broad outlines of a different approach may be indicated by briefly
noting, first, the more important characteristics of the traditional, cus-
tomary right of self-defense, secondly, the considerations which should
guide a genuine, as contrasted with a spurious, interpretation of the whole
United Nations Charter, and, thirdly, the more obvious factors in the
context of this particular confrontation between the United States and
the Soviets which should be taken into account in any serious assessment
of the necessity and proportionality of the United States' action.
Historically, states have demanded, and reciprocally honored, a right of
self-defense of considerable, though not unlimited, scope. In broadest
formulation, this right of self-defense, as established by traditional prac-
tice, authorizes a state which, being the target of activities by another
state, reasonably decides, as third-party observers may determine reason-
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ableness, that such activities imminently require it to employ the military
instrument to protect its territorial integrity and political independence,
to use such force as may be necessary and proportionate for securing its
defense.' In a still primitively organized world in which expectations
are low about the effective capability of the general community to protect
its individual members, this right has been regarded as indispensable to
the maintenance of even the most modest minimum order.
The more important limitations imposed by the general community upon
this customary right of self-defense have been, in conformity with the
overriding policy it serves of minimizing coercion and violence across
state lines, those of necessity and proportionality. The conditions of
necessity required to be shown by the target state have never, however,
been restricted to "actual armed attack" ; 2 imminence of attack of such
high degree as to preclude effective resort by the intended victim to
non-violent modalities of response has always been regarded as sufficient
justification, and it is now generally recognized that a determination of
imminence requires an appraisal of the total impact of an initiating state's
coercive activities upon the target state's expectations about the costs of
preserving its territorial integrity and political independence. 3 Even
the highly restrictive language of Secretary of State Webster in the
Caroline case, specifying a "necessity of self defense, instant, overwhelm-
ing, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation," did not
require "actual armed attack, ' 4 and the understanding is now wide-
spread that a test formulated in the previous century for a controversy
between two friendly states is hardly relevant to contemporary contro-
versies, involving high expectations of violence, between nuclear-armed
protagonists. The requirement of proportionality, in further expression
of the policy of minimizing coercion, stipulates that the responding use
of the military instrument by the target state be limited in intensity and
magnitude to what is reasonably necessary promptly to secure the per-
missible objectives of self-defense under the established conditions of
necessity.
The honoring in international law of a customary right of self-defense
has not meant-the point may bear emphasis-the exaltation of unilateral
decision by particular states over inclusive decision by the general com-
munity. It has indeed been accepted principle that a target state may
make a first, provisional decision that the conditions of necessity are such
as to require it immediately to employ the military instrument for preserva-
tion of its territorial integrity and political independence. Given the
1 Fuller exposition and historical development of the principle are offereda in Mc-
Dougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, Ch. 3 (1961). See
also Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law (1958); Brownlie, "The Use of Force
in Self-Defence," 37 Brit. Yr. Bk. of Int. Law 183 (1961).
2 Brownlie, Zoo. cit. note 1 above, 202, 220, 227.
3 McDougal and Feliciano, op. cit. note 1 above, 229 et seq.
4 Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox, April 24, 1841, in 29 British and Foreign State Papers
1129, 1138 (1840-41). Sed also Jennings, "The Caroline and McLeod Cases," 32
A.J.I.L. 82 (1938).
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continuing ineffectiveness of the general community organization to act
quickly and certainly for the protection of states, no other principle could
be either acceptable to states or conducive to minimum order. Save for
an occasional uninformed and uniformly rejected whisper, it has, however,
been generally agreed that both this first provisional decision by a claimant
target state and the measures it actually takes are subject to review for
their necessity and proportionality by the general community of states5
The principle of auto-interpretation, that each state is authorized to inter-
pret customary principles, has never been applied, any more to claims
of self-defense than to claims about other matters, to preclude other states
from passing upon the degree to which the actions of a particular state
conform to general community expectations. Fortunately, today the
authority structures of the United Nations, despite all their other weak-
nesses, do provide quickly available and convenient fora for general com-
munity review of the lawfulness of particular claims to employ the mili-
tary instrument.
The position taken by Professor Wright that Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter must be construed to limit the customary right of self-
defense by states to reactions against "actual armed attack" would not
appear to be supported by any of the commonly accepted principles for
the interpretation of international agreements. It may be recalled that
the appropriate goal in interpreting great constitutional agreements, such
as the United Nations Charter, is that of ascertaining the genuine expecta-
tions, created by the framers and by successive appliers of the agreement,
in contemporary community members about what future decisions should
be; the words and behavior in the past are relevant only as they affect
contemporary expectations about the requirements of future decision.
There is not the slightest evidence that the framers of the United Nations
Charter, by inserting one provision which expressly reserves a right of
self-defense, had the intent of imposing by this provision new limitations
upon the traditional right of states. 6 In fact, as Professor Bowett sum-
marizes, the preparatory work suggests "only that the article should safe-
guard the right of self-defence, not restrict it." Thus, Committee 1/I
stressed in its report, approved by both Commission I and the Plenary Con-
ference, that "The use of arms in legitimate self defense remains admitted
5 Brownlie, loe. cit. note 1 above, 209; McDougal and Feliciano, op. cit. note 1 above,
218.
e The exact wording of Art. 51 may be noted: "Nothing in the present Charter
;hall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security."
7Bowett, op. cit. note 1 above, 188. Cf. Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of
Force by Individual States in International Law," 81 Hague Academy Recueil des
Cours 45. 5, 497 (1952).
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and unimpaired." 8 The apparent purpose of the inept language of
Article 51, commonly ascribed to the late Senator Vandenburg, was only
that of accommodating regional organizations, as specifically envisioned
for the inter-American system by the Act of Chapultepec, with the more
comprehensive, centralized system of collective security projected by the
Charter. Similarly, nothing in the "plain and natural meaning" of the
words of the Charter requires an interpretation that Article 51 restricts
the customary right of self-defense. The proponents of such an inter-
pretation substitute for the words "if An armed attack occurs" the very
different words "if, and only if, an armed attack occurs," The fallacy
in this word-juggling we have elsewhere described:
A proposition that "if A, then B" is not equivalent to, and does
not necessarily imply, the proposition that "if, and only if, A, then
B." To read one proposition for the other, or to imply the latter
from the former, may be the result of a policy choice, conscious or
otherwise, or of innocent reliance upon the question-begging Latinism
inclusio unius est exclusio alterius; such identification or implication
is assuredly not a compulsion of logic. If a policy choice is in fact
made, it should be so articulated as to permit its assessment.0
The factitious character of a reading of Article 51 to restrict the customary
right of self-defense becomes even more apparent when Article 51 is re-
lated to Article 2(4), embodying the Charter's principal prohibition of
force. Article 2(4) refers to both the threat and use of force and com-
mits the Members to refrain from "threat or use of force against the terri-
torial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations"; the cus-
tomary right of defense, as limited by the requirements of necessity and
proportionality, can scarcely be regarded as inconsistent with the purposes
of the United Nations, and a decent respect for balance and effectiveness
would suggest that a conception of impermissible coercion, which includes
threats of force, should be countered with an equally comprehensive and
adequate conception of permissible or defensive coercion, honoring appro-
priate response to threats of imminent attack. There is, further, nothing
in the subsequent conduct of the parties to the agreement expressed in
the United Nations Charter which would indicate genuine shared ex-
pectations that they had in Article 51 given up their customary right of
self-defense; indeed, again, the most relevant official utterances would sug-
gest the exact opposite.' 0 Finally, under the hard conditions of the con-
temporary technology of destruction, which makes possible the complete
obliteration of states with still incredible speed from still incredible dis-
8 Report of Rapporteur of Committee 1 to Commission I, 6 U.IN.C.I.O. Does. 446,
459. Discussed with further references in McDougal and Feliciano, op. cit. note 1 above,
235.
9 M cDougal and Feliciano, op. cit. note 1 above, 237, note 261.
1oRelevant official utterances are collected in Mallison, "Limited Naval Blockade
or Quarantine-Interdietion: National and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under
International Law," 31 George Washington Law Rev. 335 (1962), and in McDevitt,
"The UN Charter and the Cuban Quarantine," 17 The JAG Journal 71 (1963).
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tances, the principle of effectiveness, requiring that agreements be inter-
preted in accordance with the major purposes and demands projected
by the parties, could scarcely be served by requiring states confronted
with necessity for defense to assume the posture of "sitting ducks." Any
such interpretation could only make a mockery, both in its acceptability
to states and in its potential application, of the Charter's major purpose
of minimizing unauthorized coercion and violence across state lines.
A serious review from general community perspectives of the conditions
of necessity confronting the United States when it imposed the quarantine
would of course require systematic and disciplined appraisal of many
features of the context of the particular events to which the United States
reacted.1 Some of the more important of these features may be briefly
indicated under certain category headings useful for the description of
any social process, persuasive or coercive: participants, objectives, situa-
tion, base values, strategies, and outcomes.
Participants. The threat against which the United States reacted came
from the Soviet Union, not Cuba. The Castro regime contributed to the
threat, but more as puppet or as potential irresponsible brandisher of
borrowed nuclear weapons. The suggestion by Professor Wright that
in the "Cuban quarantine" the United States was dealing with "un-
palatable action or attitudes of a small state" scarcely accords with reality.
Objectives. The objectives of the Soviet Union in moving major mili-
tary power into the Western Hemisphere were clearly expansionist. The
missiles, had their installation been achieved, would have been directly
pointed toward the "territorial integrity" of all states within range.
The explicit and consistent public utterances of its official spokesmen, the
totalitarian character of its internal structures of authority, and the
monolithic character of its demanded system of world public order raised
grave question about the genuineness of the Soviet Union's dedication to
the basic principle of minimum order, that violence and coercion are not
to be used as instruments of expansion across state lines.
Situation. The general geographic area into which the Soviet Union
was moving was one which the United States and other states in the
Hemisphere had long specified, through the Mouroe Doctrine and other-
wise, as of especial strategic concern to them. The specific location being
sought by the Soviet Union for its missiles would, in more particular, have
by-passed the Dewline warning system maintained by the United States
for securing advance notice of the launching of missiles from the Soviet
Union.12 The by-passing of the Dewline would have grievously reduced
the United States' reaction time to possible attacks from the Soviet Union,
thus causing a serious disruption in the whole world balance of power
between the totalitarian and non-totalitarian states. Even a few days'
11 A comprehensive and persuasive review is offered in Mallison, Zoo. cit. note 10 above.
The requirements of "collective self-defense," not considered in this editorial, are
also discussed by Mallison, as well as by McDevitt, Zoc. cit. note 10 above.
12 This point, among many others, is cogently developed by McfDevitt, Zoo. cit. note
10 above.
1963]
HeinOnline -- 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 601 1963
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [o5
delay by the United States in taking appropriate measures would have
meant that the missiles would be in place and the situation irreversible.
Expectations of crisis in the world arena as a whole were high, and
estimates of prompt and effective action from the organized community of
states for ameliorating particular crises were realistically low.
Bases of Power. The Soviet Union, as one of the world's two major
Powers, obviously disposed of ample bases of power to put into effect the
threats explicit in its behavior.
Strategies. The strategies employed by the Soviet Union included
manipulation of the military instrument in its most awesome and grue-
some contemporary form, Special advantage was at first sought clandes-
tinely, but this use of the military instrument was at all times accompanied
by a fanfare of other instruments-ideological, economic, and diplomatic-
with an explicit promise of still more to come in all areas of the Hemi-
sphere. The reference by Professor Wright to the shipping and installa-
tion of missiles as "trade" between the Soviet Union and Cuba in "time
of peace" would appear ,at least mildly euphemistic.
Outcomes. The outcome almost within the grasp of the Soviet Union
was that of a new, more direct military threat to the whole of the Americas,
with most major cities and military bases brought within the reach of
momentary nuclear destruction. The intensity of the coercion which this
nearly achieved threat imposed upon the United States and the other
Members of the Organization of American States was accurately reflected
in the unanimity, celerity, and effectiveness with which they acted, once
the character and dimensions of the threat became apparent.
Responsible appraisal from general community perspectives of the pro-
portionality of the action taken by the United States in response to the
threat from the Soviet Union must require a similarly comprehensive
reference to the major features of the context of that action. We may
note some of the more important features by the same headings.
Participants. Though the decision to impose the quarantine was first
taken by the United States alone, quick confirmation that this decision was
not an egocentric one, in the special interest of the United States only,
came from the other Members of the Organization of American States
in associating themselves with the United States.13
Objectives. The immediate, manifest objectives of the United States
were defensive: to secure the withdrawal and elimination of nuclear weap-
ons from Cuba. The historic precedent by which Cuba was initially set
free, the generally democratic internal structures of authority in the
United States, and the pluralistic world order of independent states tra-
ditionally demanded and supported by the United States did not suggest
covert, expansionist objectives.
Situation. The geographic area within which the United States applied
its power was located largely upon the high seas, entailing the least pos-
sible interference within the internal territorial domain of any state.
13 The details of the action by the Organization of American States are presented
in Mallison, and MeDevitt, oc. cit. note 10 above.
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The duration of the interference was limited to that necessary to the
effectiveness of defense.
Bases of Power. The bases of power of the United States and its asso-
ciates, though great, were not sufficiently disparate from those of the
Soviet Union and its associates to suggest disguised duress.
Strategies. The use by the United States of the military instrument
was as limited as could have been fashioned, extending only to the selective
interdiction of certain types of weapons. The United States acted openly,
after advance warning that the establishment of an offensive military base
in Cuba would be regarded as a threat to its security. The United States
immediately reported its action to the United Nations Security Council,
asking for appropriate measures from that body.
Outcomes. The quarantine was a reversible action, causing no irremedi-
able destruction. The employment of force which it authorized was clearly
limited in intensity and magnitude to that necessary to removal of the
provoking threat.
Even this impressionistic recall of some of the more salient features
of the larger context of threat and response should suffice to suggest that
a third-party observer, genuinely concerned to clarify the common interests
of all peoples, could reasonably conclude that the action taken by the United
States was in accord with traditional general community expectations
about the requirements of self-defense.1 4 The flow of pertinent comment
and decision since the incident would indeed seem to confirm that this
has been the overwhelming conclusion of world public opinion.15
In a better organized world, mankind might be able to dispense with a
conception of self-defense which confers upon a claimant target state as
much initial discretion as does the conception so long honored in customary
international law. Until that better organization is more nearly achieved,
the task which confronts free peoples is, however, that of clarifying and
applying a conception of self-defense which will serve their common in-
terests in minimum order without imposing upon them paralysis in the face
14 The same conclusion is reached by Mallison, Zoc. cit. note 10 above, and McDevitt,
loo. cit. note 10 above. See also Oliver, "International Law and the Quarantine of
Cuba," 57 A.J.I.L. 373 (1963); MeWhinney, ," 'Coexistence', the Cuba Crisis, and
Cold War International Law," 18 International Journal 67 (1962-63); Seligman, "The
Legality of the United States Quarantine Action in Cuba," 49 A.B.A.J. 142 (1963);
Larson, letter to the New York Times, Nov. 12, 1962, p. 28, cols. 5, 6; and statements
by Professors Berle, Dillard, Lissitzyn, and Pugh in Columbia Law School News, Nov.
7, 1962.
The approach in Chayes, "Law and the Quarantine of Cuba," 41 Foreign Affairs
550 (1963), and, other official statements, builds more upon "regional arrangement"
than upon self-defense. It is hardly to be expected, however, that general community
expectation will immunize even the "political" or "legislative" decisions of the
Security Council in reviewing regional measures from the basic constitutional policies
of necessity and proportionality.
1 It may be remembered how the tone of professional and popular comment changed
when Ambassador Stevenson introduced into the Security Council certain photographic
exhibits of Soviet activities in Cuba. For a description of this occasion, see 9 U. N.
Review 6, 11 (November, 1962).
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of attacks from community members who do not genuinely accept the
principle of minimum order. The importance of the incident of the
Soviet-Cuban quarantine is in its indication that such a clarification and
application can effectively be made and that free peoples do not, as some
have insisted, have to choose between the historic restraints of international
law and their own survival.
MnREs S. MoDouGAL
THE SIXTH COMMITTEE AND NEW LAW
There can no longer be doubt that a significant segment of mankind is
in search of new law. This theme is on the lips of delegates of more than
half of the Members of the United Nations as they speak in the Sixth
Committee. What do they want in uttering the magic word "new"?
The record suggests that the demand in the Sixth Committee can-be under-
stood only as a part of the appeal being voiced in all committees of the
United Nations and in the specialized agencies as well. It is the reflection
in law of the search for recognition of human dignity-to be achieved in
part by satisfaction of economic and cultural needs such as food and
literacy, and in part by recognition that the day of colonialism is over.1
Current consideration of a desirable future direction for the develop-
ment of international law has evolved from this urge for recognition of
human dignity through a series of stages understood only by those who
have witnessed its evolution. It is personified in the item "friendly rela-
tions and cooperation among states conforming to the Charter of the
United Nations" as it appeared on the agenda of the Sixth Committee
during the 17th Assembly.2 This item continues to be in the forefront
of the contemporary development of international law as it becomes the
principal business of the Sixth Committee for the 18th Assembly" and
probably for many of the sessions that are to follow.
Superficially, the work of the Sixth Committee, especially as it has re-
lated to development of this item, has sometimes been treated as an in-
separable part of the exacerbated rivalry between two hemispheres. 4 This
mental association is, in part, because the U.S.S.R. and its allies have been
quick to appreciate the extent to which the newly developing nations of
both Hemispheres are in search of new law to embody their interpretation
of recognition of their aspirations. Having comprehended the revolution-
ary force of these aspirations with their consequent advantage to those
who espouse a world of revolutionary change, statesmen of the Communist-
oriented states have called for the development of a new international
1 See report of Mr. Pessou (Dahomey): "It was the Committee's duty to place its
greatest hopes in the future of a law which would safeguard the dignity and integrity
of mankind, and for that purpose each State should act in conformity with the
principles of the Charter without looking to see whether the other States were actually
observing those principles." See U.N. Doe. Prov. A/C.6/SR. 759, pp. 3-4.
2 See General Assembly Res. 1686 (XVI)) Dec. 18, 1961.
8 See General Assembly Res. 1815 (XVII), Dee. 18, 1962.
4See report of Mr. Vasquez (Colombia), U.N. Doe. Prov. A/O.6/SR. 761, p. 15.
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